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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

*

RUSSELL MINER ANDERSON,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 880257

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from two convictions of second degree
murder, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989).

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Is application of Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4)(b)

(Supp. 1988) to guilty and mentally ill defendants violative of
the due process clause of Utah Const, art. 1, § 7?
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

sentencing to the Utah State Prison defendant who was convicted
of two homicides and failed to meet the statutory criteria which
would have entitled him to specialized treatment and placement
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5(4) (Supp. 1988)?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable statutes and constitutional provisions
for a determination of this case are;

Utah Const, art. 1, S 7s
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(4) (Supp. 1989)i
"Mental illness" means a mental disease
or defect. A mental defect may be a
congenital condition or one the result of
injury or a residual effect of a physical or
mental disease. Mental illness does not mean
a personality or character disorder or
abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal conduct.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1988)t1
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill
being tendered by a defendant to any charge,
the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine the claim of
mental illness of the defendant. Mental
illness, for this purpose, is determined by
the definition stated in Subsection 76-2305(4). The court may order the defendant to
be evaluated at the Utah State Hospital or
any other suitable facility, and may receive
the evidence of any private or public expert
witness whose evidence is offered by the
defendant or the prosecutor. A defendant who
tenders a plea of "guilty and mentally ill"
shall be examined first by the trial judge in
compliance with the standards for taking
pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be
advised that a plea of guilty and mentally
ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent
plea. If the defendant is later found not to
be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise
lawfully made remains a valid plea of guilty
and the defendant shall be sentenced as any
other offender. If the court concludes that
the defendant is currently mentally ill,
applying the standards set forth in this
section, the defendant's plea shall be
accepted and he shall be sentenced as a
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5 was amended in 1989 to delete any
reference to "other suitable facility." Other numerical changes
were made. Reference herein will be to the 1988 version in
effect at the time of defendant's plea.

mentally ill offender. Expenses of
examination, observation, or treatment,
excluding travel to and from any mental
health facility, shall be charged to the
county, except when the offense is a state
offense, the state shall pay part of all of
the expense where the Legislature has
expressly appropriated money for this
purpose. Travel expenses shall be charged to
the county in which the prosecution is
commenced. Examination of defendants charged
with municipal or county ordinance violations
shall be charged to the municipality or
county commencing the prosecution.

(3) If the defendant is found guilty and
mentally ill, the court shall impose any
sentence which could be imposed under law
upon a defendant who is convicted of the same
offense. Before sentencing, the court shall
conduct a hearing to determine the
defendant's present mental status.
(4) The court shall in its sentence order
hospitalization at the Utah State Hospital or
other suitable facility if, upon completion
of the hearing and consideration of the
record, the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that:
(a) the defendant has a mental illness
as defined by Subsection 76-2-305(4);
(b) because of his mental illness the
defendant poses an immediate physical
danger to others or self, which may
include jeopardizing his own or others'
safety, health, or welfare if placed in a
correctional or probation setting, or
lacks the ability to provide the basic
necessities of life, such as food,
clothing, and shelter, if placed on
probation;
(c) the defendant lacks the ability to
engage in a rational decision-making
process regarding the acceptance of mental
treatment as demonstrated by evidence of
inability to weigh the possible costs and

benefits of treatment;

2

(d) there is no appropriate treatment
alternative to a court order of
hospitalization; and
(e) the Utah State Hospital or other
suitable facility can provide the
defendant with treatment, care, and
custody that is adequate and appropriate
to the defendant's conditions and needs.

(7) The period of confinement to the Utah
State Hospital or other suitable facility,
as provided for in this section, may in no
circumstance be longer than the maximum
sentence imposed by the court.
(8) When the Utah State Hospital or other
suitable facility proposes to discharge a
defendant prior to the expiration of
sentence, the institution shall transmit
to the Board of Pardons a report on the
condition of the defendant, including the
clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course
of treatment, the prognosis for the
remission of symptoms, the potential for
recidivism and for the danger to himself
and the public, and the recommendations
for future treatment. The Board of
Pardons shall direct that the defendant
serve any or all of the unexpired term of
the sentence at the Utah State Prison, or
place the defendant on parole. If the
Board of Pardons, pursuant to law or
administrative rules, considers for parole
any defendant who has been adjudged guilty
and mentally ill, the board shall consult
with the treating facility or agency and
an additional report on the condition of
the defendant may be filed with the board.
Pending action of the board, the defendant
shall remain at the institution at which
he is hospitalized. If the defendant is
placed on parole, treatment shall, upon
the recommendation of the hospital
2
Subsections (c) and (d) were found unconstitutional as applied
to criminal defendants and should be disregarded for purposes of
this appeal. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271-72 (Utah
1988).

facility, be made a condition of parole,
and failure to continue treatment or other
condition of parole except by agreement
with the designated facility and the Board
of Pardons is a basis for initiating
parole violation hearings. The period of
parole may not be for fewer than five
years or until the expiration of the
defendant's sentence, whichever comes
first, and may not be reduced without
consideration by the Board of Pardons of a
current report on the mental health status
of the offender.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Russell Miner Anderson, was charged by
information with two counts of criminal homicide, murder in the
first degree, each a capital offense (R. 23-24).

Under a plea

agreement, the charges were reduced to two counts of murder in
the second degree, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989), to which defendant entered
pleas of guilty and mentally ill (R. 23, 25, 28-35).
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1988),
an evidentiary hearing was held prior to sentencing before the
Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Third Judicial District,
State of Utah.

On June 15, 1988, the trial court found defendant

mentally ill but not otherwise meeting the criteria of § 77-3521.5, and sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for two
consecutive terms of five years to life (R. 59-61).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 22, 1987, the bodies of Norman and Janet
Armstrong, a mentally defective couple, were found below
Interstate 80 at approximately 6000 West North Temple, Salt Lake
County, Utah (R. 24; R. 90 at 21). Each had died from multiple

gunshot wounds (R. 24). Three days later, defendant was arrested
and charged with the murders as capital offenses (R. 3, 23-25)•
On March 16, 1988, having considered all relevant
pretrial evaluations, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, Third
Judicial District, found defendant competent to stand trial (R.
5, 92). Defendant does not contest the competency finding.
Shortly thereafter on April 4, 1988, as a result of
plea bargaining, the charges were reduced to two counts of murder
in the second degree, first degree felonies, to which defendant
entered pleas of guilty and mentally ill (R. 23, 25, 28-35).
Defendant was advised, at the time of the plea, by the Honorable
Leonard Russon, Judge, Third Judicial District, consistent with
the requirements of Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5).

Further, defendant

was advised that his plea was not a contingent plea.

The

determination of whether defendant was mentally ill would dictate
placement for purposes of sentencing but not otherwise affect the
validity of the guilty plea (R. 92; R. 89 at 3-4). Defendant
does not challenge the entry of his plea.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(1) (Supp.
1988), an evaluation of defendant was ordered prior to sentencing
to determine if defendant fit within the statutory definition of
guilty and mentally ill and should, therefore, be placed at a
facility other than the prison for treatment (R. 36, 38-39). An
evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Leonard Russon on June
14 and 15, 1988 (R. 58-59).

Having considered the testimony of

five psychologists and two lay witnesses, the trial court found
defendant to be mentally ill as defined in Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-

305(4) (Supp. 1989) but not otherwise meeting the criteria of
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4), such that specialized placement
would be appropriate (R. 59-61).

Judge Russon then sentenced

defendant to the statutory term of five years to life on each
count, to run consecutively (R. 60-61).

Written -Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law" were entered on June 26, 1988 (R.
71-75). (See Appendix attached for complete Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law).
The testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing
consisted of that of Doctors Stephen Golding and Oren H. Ogilvie
for the defense; and, Doctors Van 0. Austin, Robert J. Howell and
Robert Heinbecker as well as two jail guards for the State

(R.

89).
Dr. Oren H. Ogilvie, as the clinical director for the
Davis County Mental Health Center, had evaluated defendant in
1987 in connection with a third and separate homicide charge in
Davis County (R. 89 at 8). The purpose of the 1987 evaluation
was only to determine defendant's competency to stand trial and
whether he had diminished mental capacity at the time of the
Davis County homicide (R. 89 at 10; Exhibit 1-D). Dr. Ogilvie
never specifically evaluated defendant for purposes of sentencing
placement but based his present conclusions on the prior
evaluation.

Dr. Ogilvie testified that defendant had "mild to

moderate retardation" with defendant's I.Q. score being
3
consistently in the high 60's range since 1964 (R. 89 at 10).
3
The average I.Q. is considered to be between 90 and 100; "subaverage intellectual functioning" is defined as an I.Q. 70 or
below (R. 89 at 22).

Based on this, Dr. Ogilvie concluded defendant to be mentally ill
as statutorily defined in Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4) (R. 89 at
11-12).

Further, he believed that without "very significant

structural limitations placed on [defendant's] activities and
behavior", defendant would represent a serious danger to others
if ever released from custody (R. 89 at 13).

Dr. Ogilvie had

some concerns of defendant being led by others if incarcerated at
the prison based on a report of Dr. Judith Sheperd done in 1973
as part of a 90-day presentence evaluation (R. 89 at 13-14;
Exhibit 2-D). However, Dr. Ogilvie did not have nor consider the
reports of defendant's long term incarceration at the Utah State
Prison in 1981-82 nor at Bonneville Community Correction Center
in 1982 (R. 89 at 20). Dr. Ogilvie did not express an opinion as
to the appropriateness of placing defendant at the state mental
hospital nor as to any need for treatment.
The defense next called Dr. Stephen Golding, professor
of psychology and director of clinical training at the University
of Utah (R. 89 at 24-25).

Dr. Golding had evaluated defendant in

May of 1988 for purposes of this case to determine appropriate
placement of defendant under the criteria of Utah Code Ann. § 7735-21.5(4) (R. 89 at 25).

Dr. Golding agreed that defendant was

mildly to moderately retarded.

He classified such mental

retardation as mental illness as statutorily defined (R. 89 at
28-29).

Dr. Golding testified that in his opinion defendant also

suffered from several personality disorders, specifically
••dependent personality disorder, schizoid personality and
antisocial personality disorder" (R. 89 at 33).

Dr. Golding

agreed with Dr. Ogilvie that in a probationary or unstructured
setting, defendant posed a serious danger to others.

The doctor

believed that if defendant had access to drugs, he could commit
another homicide (R. 89 at 36). Dr. Golding had never observed
defendant in a custodial setting and was not specifically
familiar with the structure of the Utah State Prison (R. 89 at
60, 65). Despite this, Dr. Golding testified that in a
correctional setting such as the Utah State Prison, defendant
might be "chosen as a victim" and was very likely to come to the
attention of prison authorities through attempts to obtain
illegal drugs or by acting out (R. 89 at 41-42).

For this

reason, Dr. Golding testified defendant should be placed at the
state hospital because it offered a "consistent and secure"
environment whereas in his opinion defendant could more easily
secure drugs at the prison (R. 89 at 51-53).

Contrary to all the

other experts, Dr. Golding testified that defendant could improve
through treatment even though the "fundamental retardation will
not get better" (R. 89 at 55). In this regard, Dr. Golding
conceded that while he preferred the state hospital, defendant
could be adequately treated for all his mental illnesses at the
state prison (R. 89 at 80). Dr. Golding could not predict if
defendant, even with treatment, would ever be able to function on
his own in society because of his dangerousness (R. 89 at 55).
On the basis of the above testimony, the defense rested
(R. 89 at 81).
The State called Drs. Austin and Heinbecker, forensic
psychiatrists at the Utah State Hospital, and Dr. Howell, a

consulting psychologist at the hospital.

Dr. Austin had

evaluated defendant in 1973, and twice in 1988 (R. 89 at 82). In
all three evaluations, Dr. Austin had concluded that defendant
was not clinically mentally ill (R. 89 at 83). However, he
recognized that under the Utah statutory definition of mental
illness as a mental defect, defendant's mental retardation would
be classified as mental illness (R. 89 at 84). In his opinion,
the only treatment needs of defendant were general counseling for
drug abuse and vocational training.

Both of these could be met

at the state prison (R. 89 at 93). Dr. Howell agreed with Dr.
Austin but viewed defendant as having a personality disorder in
that he abused alcohol and drugs (R. 89 at 98). Having reviewed
the records of defendant's prior incarceration in prison, Dr.
Howell saw no problem with defendant being placed in the prison
and did not view the state hospital as suitable (R. 89 at 100).
Based on defendant's history of aggressive acts to others, Dr.
Howell believed defendant posed a danger to other persons unless
in a structured environment (R. 89 at 99-100).

Dr. Heinbecker

testified similarly, concluding that defendant did not have any
mental diseases or defects which the hospital could treat
effectively (R. 89 at 129, 132, 132-134).

The doctors agreed

with the other experts that based on the statutory definition of
mental illness under S 76-2-305(4), defendant qualified as
mentally ill but that his only "mental illness" was mental
retardation (R. 89 at 84, 102, 128). All three doctors from the
Utah State Hospital agreed that their institution could not
properly treat defendant's mental retardation (T. 83, 104, 128).

Based on their observations of defendant while
incarcerated at the Salt Lake County Jail, Corporal Kelly Roberts
and Officer Edward Culbert of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office testified that defendant posed no danger to himself or
others while jailed. In their opinion, defendant was a model
prisoner while incarcerated (T. 120-21, 124-25).
Based on all the testimony, Judge Russon ruled
defendant had failed to met his burden of establishing by clear
and convincing evidence that appropriate placement of defendant
would be in a facility other than the state prison (R. 74,
Findings, 11 9). (See Appendix attached for Complete Findings of
Fact).

The trial court found defendant mentally ill under § 76-

2-305(4) based on defendant's mild to moderate mental retardation
(R. 72, Findings, 11 2). The court found that defendant "has
several personality disorders and tends to abuse drugs and
alcohol, conditions which do not constitute mental illness as set
by § 76-2-305(4)" (R. 73, Findings, % 3).
With regard to S 77-35-21.5(4)(b), the trial court
concluded that based on defendant's previous incarcerations, he
would not be an immediate physical danger to others or self in a
correctional institution, "where he would not have access to
drugs or alcohol" (R. 72, Findings, 11 5). The court specifically
found that defendant would be able to function at the state
prison based on the evidence of defendant's prior long term
incarcerations (R. 72, Findings, 11 5).
In determining that the prison was a suitable facility
for defendant and could provide all necessary treatment and

vocational needs, the trial court also considered the testimony
of all the experts that defendant presented a danger to society
and concluded in reference to S 77-35-21.5(4)(e) that:
[T]he Utah State Hospital is not a suitable
facility for providing the defendant with the
treatment, care and custody that is
appropriate to the defendant's conditions and
needs, because no therapies are available to
treat defendant's problem of retardation
which is permanent. Further, that the Utah
State Hospital cannot provide the secure
custody necessary for defendant who stands
convicted of two homicides in Salt Lake
County, is awaiting sentencing in Davis
County on a subsequent second degree
homicide, and who tends to abuse drugs and/or
alcohol.
(R. 73-74, Findings, II 8).

The court, therefore, sentenced

defendant on each count to the statutory indeterminate term of
five years to life, to run consecutively, and to be served at the
Utah State Prison (R. 60-61).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant raises for the first time on appeal the issue
of whether the application of Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4)(b)
(Supp. 1988) to guilty and mentally ill defendants violates due
process of law.

Having failed to properly raise the issue below,

this Court should preclude defendant from attacking the
constitutionality of S 77-35-21.5(4)(b) on appeal.
Should this Court consider defendant's constitutional
claim on the merits, Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4)(b) must be
viewed as a constitutional legislative enactment in that the
statute rationally effectuates a legitimate governmental
objective and is fair in its application to all guilty and
mentally ill offenders.

Even assuming arguendo, the trial court erred in
interpreting Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4) (Supp. 1989) as
excluding all personality disorders from its definition of mental
illness, the court cured any error by affording defendant the
opportunity to demonstrate that his personality disorders were
within the correct statutory definition.

Further, the trial

court factually found defendant mentally ill for sentencing
purposes.
Since there is ample evidence to support its findings
and conclusions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the Utah State Prison was the optimal facility
to treat and care for defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPLICATION OF UTAH
21.5(4)(b) (SUPP. 1988)
MENTALLY ILL DEFENDANTS
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF
CONSTITUTION.
A.

CODE ANN. S 77-35TO GUILTY AND
DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE UTAH

Defendant is Precluded from Raising the
Constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 7735-21.5(4)(b) for the First Time on
Appeal.

Defendant raises for the first time on appeal the
question of whether the application of Utah Code Ann. S 77-3521.5(4)(b) (Supp. 1988) to guilty and mentally ill defendants
violates Utah'8 due process clause. Absent exceptional
circumstances, an appellate court should not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal.

State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d

252, 254 (Utah 1983); State v. Van Matre# 777 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah
1989).

This rule applies as well to constitutional issues.
*-* *•»*

*•»•»

/ni-Ah

19821.

Here, defendant has been found guilty of two homicides
and does not contest that finding.

His complaint is with the

court's determination of placement for purposes of sentencing and
treatment.

As such, M[t]he defendant's right to liberty is not

in issue because he will be confined, either in the hospital or
in prison," State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Utah 1988).
Accord, Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 815-17 (1st Cir. 1988).
This Court should therefore preclude defendant from raising a
constitutional attack against § 77-35-21.5(4)(b) for the first
time on appeal.
B.

Utah Code Ann. Section 77-35-21.5(4)(b)
Rationally Effectuates a Legitimate
Governmental Objective and is Thus Not
Violative of the Due Process Clause.

In the event this Court addresses defendant's due
process claim, the challenged statute must be reviewed for
constitutional deficiency on its face and as applied.

Wells v.

Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984).
However, statutes must be construed to avoid constitutional
infirmities whenever possible.

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d

1314, 1317 (Utah 1983); In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah
1981).

Legislative enactments are entitled to a presumption of

constitutionality.

State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah

1987).

Accord, In Re N.H.B., 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah App.

1989).

Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1988) which governs

the sentencing hearing for guilty and mentally ill defendants is
a procedural rule by which a trial court ascertains whether the
prison or another facility would be suitable for a convicted
felon.

As such, the general test of MfairnessH applies.

v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d at 204.

Wells

Applying the above, defendant fails to show that the
sentencing statute is unfair as applied to him or other guilty
and mentally ill defendants.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4) enumerates certain
criteria which a guilty and mentally ill defendant must satisfy
by clear and convincing evidence to qualify for sentencing to the
state mental hospital or other suitable facility, rather than the
state prison.

One of those criteria, subsection (b), obligates

the sentencing court to consider whether as a result of his
mental illness, a guilty and mentally ill defendant poses a
danger to others or himself if placed in a correctional facility
or probationary setting.

If the defendant is found to be of

immediate physical danger to others or himself in a correctional
setting, the trial court should consider other suitable
facilities.

If, however, the defendant would be of no danger to

himself or others in a correctional facility, the defendant may
be sentenced to prison.

Thus, subsection (b) results in an

additional procedural safeguard to a convicted felon, who would
otherwise be subject to confinement in prison, by requiring the
trial court to specifically consider the suitability of other
placement if the defendant establishes that as a result of his
mental illness he would present a danger to himself or others if
imprisoned.
Defendant seems to argue that because this Court in
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), found
unconstitutional the application of subsections (c) and (d) of S
77-35-21.5(4) to guilty and mentally ill defendants, subsection

(b) must necessarily also be found to have "no relevance in the
context of criminal sentencing" and hence violative of Utah's due
process provision.

(Br. of App. at 9-11).

However, defendant

fails to recognize that subsections (c) and (d) were solely
limited to confinement issues which this Court determined had
relevance to an involuntary civil commitment but were
inappropriate to a criminal defendant.

Ici. at 1271-72.

Subsection (b), on the other hand, deals directly with the issue
of placing a convicted and mentally ill defendant into the
correct facility for purposes of his own security as well as
society's.

As such, it rationally relates to the legislative

objective behind § 77-35-21.5(4), that is the balancing of
defendant's treatment rights against society's obligation to
protect its citizens from potentially dangerous individuals.
at 1271.

Id.

Defendant's due process argument for invalidating

subsection (b) ignores the legislative prerogative of balancing
these two conflicting interests.
Subsection (b) inquires whether a mentally ill
defendant, as a result of his mental illness, poses a danger to
others or himself in a correctional setting.

If a convicted

defendant poses no physical danger because of his mental illness
in a correctional facility, defendant may, as any convicted
felon, be sentenced to prison.

If, on the other hand, because of

his mental illness, defendant would be a danger to others or
himself if incarcerated, correctional disposition would be
improper and defendant should be considered for specialized
treatment.

State v. Deplonty, 749 P.2d 621, 626 (Utah 1987).

Subsection (b) rationally effectuates the legitimate
governmental objective of balancing a defendant's treatment needs
against society's security interests.

State v. Copeland, 765

P. 2d 1266, 1271. It requires the sentencing court to consider
whether a guilty, potentially dangerous criminal who is also
mentally ill can be treated for his mental illness and still be
secured away from society.

This balancing is coupled with a

subjective evaluation of defendant and any symptomatic
dangerousness to himself and others.

The subjectiveness of

subsection (b) provides an additional safeguard for a mentally
ill criminal defendant.

Rather than generalizing as to

suitability of the state hospital, prison or probation for all
mentally ill defendants, the statute requires the trial court to
specifically consider the appropriateness of the individual
defendant in probationary and correctional settings.
Subsection (b) is fair in its application and
rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose.
Therefore, this Court should reject defendant's due process
argument and find subsection (b) constitutionally valid as
applied to guilty and mentally ill defendants.

In re Boyer, 636

P.2d 1085, 1088; Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SENTENCED TO PRISON
DEFENDANT WHO WAS CONVICTED OF MULTIPLE
HOMICIDES AND FAILED TO MEET STATUTORY
CRITERIA WHICH WOULD HAVE ENTITLED HIM TO
SPECIALIZED TREATMENT.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1988),
the trial court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing to

determine if defendant, who had entered guilty and mentally ill
pleas to two homicides, satisfied the statutory criteria for
specialized placement (R. 89, 90). Based on the expert
testimony, the trial court concluded that defendant had failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the appropriateness or
necessity of his placement at the state hospital or another
facility (R. 71-75).

This Court will only disturb a trial

court's factual findings when clearly erroneous, State v.
DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 627 (Utah 1987), and reviews a trial
court's sentencing decision only for abuse of discretion. State
v. Gibbons, No. 860405, slip op. at 2 (Utah, Sept. 13, 1989);
State v. Holland, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 12-14 (1989); State v.
Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986).

Contrary to defendant's

argument, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing a sentence which "could be imposed under the law upon a
defendant who is convicted of the same offense", Utah Code Ann. §
77-35-21.5(3).
A.

Mental Retardation Statutorily Constitutes
Mental Illness.

The State is aware that this Court has recognized a
distinction between mental retardation and mental illness:
there are significant differences between
mental retardation and mental illness and ...
those differences may not be ignored. . . .
State v. Murphy, 760 P.2d 280, 284 (Utah 1988).

Mental

retardation is an impairment in learning capacity and thus may be
ameliorated with proper education and training.

Mental illness,

on the other hand, is a psychotic disorder which notably impairs
mental functioning.

It is treatable with psychiatric and drug

therapy, and proper counseling. Id. at 15/ relying on McClure v.
State, 737 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1987).
recognized these distinctions.

The civil statutes have

See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-

202(8) (Interim Supp. 1989) defining mental illness as:
a psychiatric disorder as defined by the
current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders which substantially impairs
a person's mental, emotional, behavioral, or
related functioning;
and, Utah Code Ann. S 62A-5-301(3) (Cumm. Supp. 1988) defining
mental retardation as:
a significant, subaverage general
intellectual functioning, existing
concurrently with deficits in adaptive
behavior and manifested during the
developmental period as defined in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Method
Disorders published by the American
Psychiatric Association.
However, for purposes of the criminal statutes, the
distinction does not exist.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4)

includes mental retardation in its definition of mental illness:
"Mental illness" means a mental disease or
defect. A mental defect may be a congenital
condition or one the result of injury or a
residual effect of a physical or mental
disease. . . .
Mental defect is considered synonymous with mental retardation.
Matter of McDuel, 369 N.W.2d 912 (Mich. App. 1985).
The statutory definition presents some problems to
psychiatrists who do not clinically classify mental retardation
as mental illness.

Some psychiatrists, like Dr. Van Austin of

the state hospital, even find it clinically offensive that mental
retardation is classified as mental illness (R. 89 at 84).

See

also Kindred, Cohen and Penrod, The Mentally Retarded Citizen and

the Law (T. Shaffer eds. 1976), cited in State v. Murphy, 760
P.2d at 285.
However, as this Court has noted, "legislative
enactments are accorded a presumption of validity," State v.
Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987). Statutes are not to be
declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis to
sustain them.

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah

1983).
Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4) is patterned on a Model
Penal Code provision which was deliberately designed to broadly
encompass changes in clinical findings of mental disease.

The

Model Code commentators found that a determination of what
constitutes mental disease or defect for purposes of criminology
could not be resolved as a question of medical terminology, and
thus, concluded the only feasible course was to treat:
the question of disease as one of fact, to be
determined by the court or jury on evidence
presented in the cases that arise.
Explanatory Note, Model Penal Code S 4.01, Mental Disease or
4
Defect Excluding Responsibility, (1985) at 174.
While the Utah legislative history does not shed light
on the reasoning behind the adoption of the language of § 76-2305(4), other than it was the model penal code version, it can
reasonably be concluded that the legislature wanted to confer the
benefit of additional sentencing procedural safeguards on the
4
The Model Penal Code provision and Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4)
primary purpose is to define mental illness for purposes of
criminal responsibility. Section 76-2-305(4) is the only
definition utilized for criminal determination of mental illness
under Utah law.

mentally defective offender as broadly as the traditional
mentally ill offender.

The legislative purpose of balancing the

placement needs of a mentally or emotionally impaired defendant
with society's need for protection and punishment remain the same
whatever the source of defendant's impairment.

It is the actual

placement decision based on defendant's need for treatment and
dangerousness to self or others which may vary.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5(4) provides an additional
level of procedural due process for a defendant.

It can only be

invoked where the defendant has raised the issue of his mental
status.

Once raised, the lower court is mandated to comply with

the evaluation and hearing requirements of the rule.
DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 627 (Utah 1988).

State v.

The protection of the

statute can easily be seen from the posture of defendant in this
case.

Defendant does not argue that the statutory definition is

overly broad because he desires mental retardation in and of
itself to be the basis of specialized treatment.

Defendant does

not argue for the more clinically accurate distinctions of State
v. Murphy to apply because defendant wishes this Court to be
obligated, as was the trial court, to consider defendant mentally
ill.
Thus, while the statutory definition of mental illness
in criminal proceedings is inconsistent with common clinical
definitions of mental illness and ignores the differentials of
mental retardation, its very breadth inures to the benefit of
convicted defendants in providing an additional sentencing
alternative.

B.

Any Error in Interpreting Utah Code Ann. S 76-2305(4) as Excluding all Personality Disorders is
Harmless.

Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously
interpreted Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4) as excluding all
personality disorders from the statute's definition of mental
illness.

(Br. of App. at 13). The phrase in question reads:
Mental illness does not mean a personality
or character disorder or abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct.

S 76-2-305(4).

Defendant contends that the trial court

erroneously assumed the phrase "manifested only by repeated
criminal conduct" modified only the last antecedent,
"abnormalities".

Under such an interpretation, S 76-2-305(4)

would by definition exclude all personality and character
disorders from the definition of mental illness.

The State

concedes that a proper reading of the statute would be that
personality, character disorder, and abnormalities are all
excluded by definition when they are manifested only by repeated
criminal conduct.

Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed.

1987, S 47.33, Referential and Qualifying Words; Salt Lake City
v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 740-41 (Utah 1977). The latter
interpretation would be consistent with the testimony of the
experts in this case who agreed that personality disorders can
constitute mental illness (R. 89 at 31, 84-86, 102, 131-33).
Moreover, the Model Penal Code from which S 76-2-305(4) was
adopted does not exclude all personality disorders, but only
those abnormalities displayed by repeated criminal behavior.

Model Penal Code S 4.01(2) (1985).
However, assuming arguendo that the trial court did
misinterpret the subsection, any error is harmless as the court
did find defendant mentally ill for sentencing purposes (R. 72,
Findings, 1111 2 & 4). Further, the trial court did not totally
disregard the evidence that defendant "has several personality
disorders and tends to abuse alcohol and drugs." (R. 74,
Findings, 11 3). The problem is not so much with the language as
with the quality of the proof.

For even if the trial court had

considered all personality disorders as potentially constituting
mental illness, defendant failed to establish by "clear and
convincing evidence" that those disorders were not merely
disorders manifested by repeated criminal conduct.

State v.

DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 627; Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4).
Even Dr. Golding, who of the five expert witnesses was
the only expert to state a clear preference for placing defendant
at the state hospital, testified that defendant's personality
disorders were manifested by continual usage of illegal drugs and
a "socially isolated kind of life" (R. 89 at 32-33).

Dr. Howard

Ogilvie of the Davis County Medical Center stated that in 1973 he
evaluated defendant and found him suffering from mixed
personality disorder with anti-social features (R. 89; Exhibit D5
See also Montana Code Ann. S 46-14-101 (1979):
As used in this chapter, the term 'mental
disease or defect' does not include an
abnormality manifested only be repeated
criminal conduct.
The Montana Code was originally adopted from the Model Penal
Code. State v. Watson, 211 Mont. 401, 686 P.2d 879, 885 (1984).

1). But, Dr. Ogilvie did not testify as to whether defendant in
1989 suffered from any personality disorders and whether any
disorders manifested themselves in ways apart from repeated
criminal conduct.

Three psychiatrists, Doctors Van Austin,

Robert Howell and Peter Heinbecker, refused to certify that
defendant suffered from personality disorders within the meaning
of S 76-2-305(4), that is, personality disorders not manifested
only by repeated criminal conduct (R. 89 at 84, 102, 128).
Thus, classifying any of defendant's personality
disorders as mental illness would not have changed the trial
court's conclusion that the prison was still the optimal facility
for defendant.

At best, the evidence established that defendant

could receive treatment at either the hospital or prison (R. 89
at 80). More accurately, the evidence established, based on
three of the examinations of defendant, that defendant's mental
illnesses could not effectively be treated at the hospital (T.
93, 99-101, 128).
C.

Defendant Failed to Establish by Clear and
Convincing Evidence that He Posed a Danger to
Himself or Others in a Correctional Facility.

Subsection (b) of S 77-35-21.5(4), discussed in Point
I, is another criterion which a guilty and mentally ill defendant
must traverse to be sentenced to a facility other than prison.
As previously contended, subsection (b) is rationally related to
a legitimate governmental objective, and therefore, should be
viewed as constitutional.
1272.

State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1267,

Pursuant to the requirements of subsection (b), the
trial court heard testimony to determine whether defendant would,
based on his mental illness, be of any immediate physical danger
to others or himself if placed in a correctional or probational
setting.

Doctors Ogilvie and Golding expressed some concerns of

prison incarceration based on what they viewed as defendant's
"dependent personality" (R. 89 at 13-14, 41-42).

Conversely,

Doctors Austin and Heinbecker presented no concerns for
defendant's safety (R. 89 at 83-84, 128). Based on defendant's
prior incarcerations, Dr. Howell testified that defendant posed
no physical danger if incarcerated (R. 89 at 100). Two lay
witnesses, Corporal Kelly Roberts and Officer Edward Culbert of
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, testified that defendant
was a model inmate during incarceration at the Salt Lake County
Jail.

None of the experts, however, testified that defendant

posed an immediate physical danger in prison specifically because
of his mental illness.

Rather, they all agreed that without a

structured environment, defendant would be extremely dangerous
due to his abuse of drugs and resultant aggressive behavior (R.
89 at 13, 36, 99-100).
Despite this, defendant contends that he is in unique
danger in prison because of his mental illness.

In support of

this claim defendant points to Dr. Judith Shepard's 1973 90-day
presentence report of defendant while at the state prison.

Based

on this report, Doctors Golding and Ogilvie had concerns for
defendant being able to cope in prison (R. 89 at 13-14, 41-42).
However, the trial court specifically found that defendant would

be able to properly function "based upon the evidence adduced
with regard to the defendant's prison incarceration in 1981 and
1982 and the present functioning in the Salt Lake County Jail"
(R. 73-74, Findings, 11 8). Moreover, the court recommended, at
the request of defendant's attorneys, that prison officials
evaluate defendant for placement in a special services dorm and
away from drugs or alcohol (R. 65; R. 90 at 23-24).
Subsection (b) only requires the sentencing court to
consider whether defendant poses "because of his mental illness
. . . an immediate physical danger to others or self, which may
include jeopardizing his own or other's safety, health or welfare
if placed in a correctional or probation setting,"

Utah Code

Ann. § 77-35-21.5(4)(b). It does not require the trial court to
consider whether a guilty and mentally ill defendant may be
easily led or abused.

The notion that a convicted felon can

escape incarceration merely because of an inability to assert
himself, could apply to any number of inmates at the prison.
statute requires a more specific showing of danger.

The

Public

policy does not dictate otherwise.
Moreover, defendant fails to recognize that he was
convicted of two homicides, and that the sentencing hearing was
merely to ascertain whether his mental illness—not his inability
to resist being led—compels that he receive specialized
treatment.
Defendant now attempts to use the trial court's accommodation
of defendant's own request for a special dorm to bootstrap his
argument that he is in danger at the prison (Br. of App. 18).
The record clearly indicated why the recommendation was included.
(See R. 90 at 23-24).

Based on the evidence, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that defendant could be safely
incarcerated in a correctional setting (R. 73-74, Findings,
%8).

D.

Defendant Failed To Establish By Clear And
Convicing Evidence That The State Hospital or
Another Facility Could Provide Him With Appropriate
Treatment And Custody.

Subsection (e) of Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4)
requires the sentencing court to consider whether "the Utah State
Hospital or other suitable facility can provide the defendant
with treatment, care and custody that is adequate and appropriate
to the defendant's conditions and needs."

Subsection (e) is the

final criteria that a guilty and mentally ill defendant must
satisfy to be sentenced to the state hospital, rather than
prison.
While a state may not have "deliberate indifference" to
the serious medical and psychiatric needs of its inmates, Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Constitution "does not
guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of his choice."
Fair, 846 F.2d 811, at 817 (1st Cir. 1988).

Jackson v.

Nor, does a

conviction of guilty and mentally ill "ipso facto entitle the
defendant to be committed to the state hospital rather than the
state prison", State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 268 (Utah 1986).
Here, a majority of the experts testified that
defendant's only mental illness is mental retardation.

While

they agreed that defendant qualifies as mentally ill under § 762-305(4), they did not believe that defendant is clinically
mentally ill.

Pursuant to their examinations of defendant, they

concluded that the state hospital could not provide defendant
with needed treatment and because of his volatility, needed
custody.
Even Dr. Goldingf who preferred to see defendant
treated at the hospital, conceded that defendant could receive
adequate treatment for all his illnesses at the prison (R. 89 at
70, 80). He also recognized the need for strict security with
defendant (R. 89 at 36).
Defendant errs in concluding that "the basis of the
trial court's ruling that defendant did not qualify to be
sentenced to a treatment facility was that the only mental
illness the trial court thought statutorily relevant—mental
retardation—is permanent and cannot be cured."

(Br. of App. at

23.) As discussed in Point 11(B), even assuming arguendo, the
trial court erroneously interpreted § 76-2-305(4) as excluding
all personality disorders, the court cured any error by finding
defendant mentally ill, by admitting all relevant testimony
concerning whether defendant also suffered from personality
disorders not manifested by repeated criminality, and by
admitting evidence to ascertain whether those disorders were
treatable at the hospital.
Having failed to convince the trial court by clear and
convincing evidence that his personality disorders fit within the
statutory definition and that those disorders required
specialized treatment, defendant should now be foreclosed from
employing a harmless error as a springboard for overturning the
trial court's factual findings.

In addition to the fact that the hospital could not
cure defendant's retardation, there was evidence that defendant
posed a high security risk.

As this Court noted in State v.

Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Utah 1988):
If neither the hospital nor any other
facility can provide 'treatment, care and
custody that are appropriate to the
defendant's conditions and needs,' placement
in such a facility may not be justified
because of the additional security burdens it
would impose. A defendant whose mental
condition is virtually and conclusively
untreatable would not necessarily be
appropriately housed in a treatment facility.
After extensive research in the area of mental retardation and
criminality, two thoughtful authors similarly concluded that:
Standard services for the mainstream retarded
population are not appropriate or sufficient
for the mentally retarded offender . . . .
State institutions are not appropriate
placements, as these offenders are more
streetwise and sophisticated, have fewer
physical handicaps, may tend to exploit
others and are oppositional to routine
....
Staff are trained to deal with
passive, multi-handicapped clients, not with
aggressive, streetwise offenders.
Sandra Garcia and Holly Steele, Mentally Retarded Offenders in
the Criminal Justice and Mental Retardation Systems in Florida:
Philosphical, Placement, and Treatment Issues, 41 Ark. L. Rev.
809, 846 (1988). '

7
Defendant asserts that at least one of the experts considered
placement of defendant at the American Fork Training School as
proper (Br. of App. at 3). Such is not the case (R. 89 at 103).
Additionally, no evidence was presented in the lower court as to
the requirements or conditions of acceptance at the state
training school for convicted defendants; nor, was there any
evidence as to treatment or security provided.
Interestingly,
the 1989 amendments to S 77-35-21.5 delete any reference to
"other suitable facility" and specifically limit placement of
guilty and mentally ill defendants to the prison, state hospital
or probation.

Considering the objective of S 77-35-21.5 is to balance
defendant's treatment needs against society's interest in
protecting its citizens from dangerous individuals, ample
evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that defendant
should be sentenced to prison.

The evidence clearly established

that the Utah State Hospital could not provide him with needed
treatment, and defendant posed a security risk if sentenced to
that institution.

Taken as a whole, the evidence supports the

trial court's conclusion that the prison could best treat, care,
and provide custody for defendant.
Defendant cites Matter of Giles, 657 P.2d 285 (Utah
1982), and Colyar v. Third Judicial District Court, 469 F.Supp.
424 (D. Utah 1979), for the proposition that a mentally ill
defendant is entitled to be sentenced to the state hospital, even
if no known treatment is available for defendant's illness.
Neither case is dispositive of the issues in defendant's case.
Both involved involuntary commitment proceedings where the issue
was under what circumstances could an individual be civilly
committed for custodial care alone.

Neither addressed the

balancing needs of treatment and security related to guilty and
mentally ill defendants.

As recognized by this Court, entirely

different functions are served by civil and criminal commitments.
In a criminal sentencing proceeding, there is no issue of
necessary confinement, only appropriate placement.

As such:

hospitalization is desirable from the
convicted individual's perspective, whereas
in involuntary civil commitment cases, the
individual's preferred choice is non
hospitalization.

State v, Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271.
In light of the legislative objective behind $ 77-3521.5 and because of the lower court's factual findings that
defendant was not entitled to specialized treatment and
placement, this Court should affixrm the trial court's judgment
that defendant be sentenced to the Utah State Prison.
CONCLUSION
Subsection (b) of S 77-35-21.5(4) is part of a fair
procedural rule for determining the appropriate placement for a
guilty and mentally ill defendant and rationally effectuates a
legitimate governmental objective. As such, this Court should
hold as constitutionally valid the application of § 77-3521.5(4)(b) to mentally ill defendants.
In applying the proper standard of review, ample
evidence supports the trial court's findings that the prison, in
contrast to other facilities, was the optimal custodial and
treatment facility for defendant who was convicted of multiple
homicides.

This Court should, therefore, affirm defendant's

convictions and sentences.
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1989.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDING OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

V•

J

RUSSELL MINER ANDERSON,

)

Case No. Cft 88-528 Hon. Leonard H. Russon
Defendant.

)

The defendant, Russell M. Anderson, represented by James
Valdez and James Bradshaw, having plead guilty and mentally ill to
two counts of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, both
first
and

degree

having

testimony

felonies, and
received

from

five

their

the

Court

reports,

(5) mental

having
and

appointed

the

Court

alienists

having

health professionals

and

heard

two (2)

jailers on June 14, 1988, and the Court having considered several
offered

exhibits

prepared

by

and

Adult

relevant
Probation

portions
and

of

Parole

a presentence
makes

the

report

following

findings:
1.

Section 77-35-21.5(4), Utah Code Annotated mandates

hospitalization for a person pleading guilty and Dentally
the defendant

establishes

by clear

and

convincing

all five sub-parts of Section 77-25-21.5(4) exist.

ill if

evidence

that

Finding of Fact and
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2.
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moderately

mentally

a

defect

mental

regard
Court

to

finds

retarded.
as

subsection
that

the

(a)

defendant

Further, that mental

defined

in

Section

The

personality
conditions
Section

disorders
which

do

and

not

The

that

tends
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constitute

illness

as
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the
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and

that

illness.
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abuse
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to
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illness

has
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in

regard

would

that

State
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defendant's

the

not

defendant

based
prison

to
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other
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than

(b)

an

immediate

of

regarding

no

mental

Section

into a correctional

will
the
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evidence

incarceration
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able

to

in 1981

and

to

setting where

Further, the Court

function
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illness,

danger

with

at
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76-2-305(4).
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mental
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3.

of

the acceptance

of mental

treatment

Section
rational

by weighing
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the

possible

costs

and

benefits

of

treatment,

even

though

the

defendant is mildly to moderately retarded and has a mental age of
10.

The defendant should not be confused with a 10 year old child

in terms

of

sophistication,

knowledge

or

innocence, but

instead

has the same ability to learn and perceive as a normal 10 year old
and could follow the direction of a treating psychiatrist without
having

a

complete

understanding

of

the

technical

jargon

and

methodologies used by that psychiatrist.
7.

With

regard

to

subsection

(d)

of

Section

77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that the Utah State Prison provides
an

appropriate

treatment

alternative

hospitalization for this defendant.

to

a

court

order

of

That based upon the testimony

of the psychiatrists who work both at the Utah State Prison and
the Utah State Hospital.

Further, that the Utah State Prison has

some programs suited to those of the defendant's needs that can be
addressed by treatment therapies.
8.

With

regard

to

subsection

(e)

of

Section

77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that the Utah State Hospital is not
a

suitable

treatment,
the

facility
care

defendant's

and

for

providing

custody

conditions

that
and

the

defendant

is adequate and

needs, because

with

the

appropriate to

no

therapies

are

available to treat the defendant's problem of retardation which is
permanent.
the

secure

Further, that
custody

the Utah State Hospital cannot provide

necessary

for

the

defendant

who

stands

•w

p/Tj
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convicted

of

two

homicides

in

Salt

Lake

County,

is

awaiting

sentencing in Davis County on a subsequent Second Degree Homicide,
and who tends to abuse drugs and/or alcohol.
9.
establish

In sum, the Court finds the defendant has failed to
by

clear

and

convincing

evidence

that

requirements of Section 77-35-21.5(4) have been met.

all

five

Although the

defendant did establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant
Section

has a mental
77-35-21.5(4),

illness as required
the

defendant

not

by subsection

only

did

not

(a) of

meet

the

burden required to establish requirements (b) through (e), but the
evidence

of

those

points

was

contrary

to

the

defendant's

contention.
THERFORE, the Court concludes that there is no compulsion
under Section
State

Hospital

77-35-21.5(4) to order hospitalization at the Utah
or

other

suitable

mental

health

facility

sentencing Russell Miner Anderson in this matter.
DATED this ^ 3 v " d a y of June, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

NARD H. RUSSON, IJUDGE

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY

in
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